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Understanding of inter-industrial relationships is indispensable for solving environmen-
tal problems. Without knowing how industries are interconnected with one another, no 
one should be able to grasp how an environmental restriction imposed on an industry 
affects other industries directly or indirectly and what the final result would be. A waste 
problem is no exception. A requirement for reduction of waste generated from an end-
of-life product (ELP) should affect not only the industry which produces that product 
but also other industries indirectly.
When it comes to a waste problem, however, there is a peculiar feature on an interac-
tive aspect between industries, interaction between environmentally friendly producers 
and environmentally friendly waste-disposal firms out of a market boundary. It is often 
found that producers and waste-disposal firms are interactively or cooperatively work-
ing, in a certain institutional environment, for waste reduction as well as prevention of 
pollution which might be accompanied with waste treatment. Such an interactive nature 
has attracted a great deal of attention, since it is considered to promote the so-called 
design for environment (DfE) and contribute to controlling the flow of environmental 
burdens at the production stage.
Yet, to the best of the author’s knowledge, this problem has not been dealt with satis-
faction by researchers so far. The purpose of this paper is to address this problem by 
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means of a Sraffian type of inter-industrial reproduction model based upon Sraffa 
(1960), which is supposed to be most suitable to the analysis of the problem.1 By so 
doing, I demonstrate how environmentally friendly production and waste disposal are 
successfully implemented in an economy and, in this sense, how a sustainable economy 
is realized. It will be shown that such implementation can be interpreted as an applica-
tion of extended producer responsibility (EPR), which is proposed by OECD.
Although problems of waste disposal or recycling have not been taken up by Sraf-
fian economists until quite recently, rudimentary works can be found in the rather early 
stages of the research. Steedman (1975, 1977) shows that negative value plays a crucial 
role in the analysis of positive profits with negative surplus value. Certainly, he does 
not explicitly deal with waste problems in his works, but his anatomy of negative value 
potentially has the seed of the study of waste problems: The idea of negative value can 
naturally be developed to that of negative prices, and those prices can be interpreted as a 
scarcity index of bads or dis-commodities.
Franke’s work (1986) shows that negative prices cannot be avoided in a joint produc-
tion model, when a free-disposal assumption is abandoned so that bads or dis-commod-
ities are taken into account. It may be said that his work is a starting point of the analysis 
of waste problems by means of a Sraffa model, although it is so general that concrete 
issues on waste treatment are not discussed explicitly.
Fujimoto and Opocher (2010), Lager (2001) and Hosoda (2010b) are more explicit in 
dealing with bads or dis-commodities in a Sarrafian type of model. Taking residuals dis-
charged from economic activities into account and discarding a free-disposal assump-
tion, they demonstrate how a capitalist economy can reproduce itself in the long run. 
Clearly, a costly disposal process, whether it is a waste-disposal process or a recycling 
process, is crucial for the reproducibility of an economy.
Although those works have contributed to the development of the Sraffian analysis 
toward exploration of relationships between an economy and environment, they more 
or less remain at an abstract level, having a distance from applicability to real environ-
mental policies. Circumstances have, however, changed gradually. Hosoda (2010a) uti-
lizes a Sraffian type of model to demonstrate the necessity of EPR, which is an effective 
waste management policy and has been adopted in many countries. He also applies the 
model to a realistic situation in which a secondary material obtained by recycling is 
degraded, demonstrating that the conventional Sraffian model can be naturally extended 
to the one which describes the transaction of commodities and bads or dis-commodities 
in a modern recycling society (Hosoda 2012, 2014).2
The present work is situated in a natural extension of the research line of the above 
studies and shares the basic structure and characteristics with them. I would like, how-
ever, to emphasize that there is a big difference between the present work and the previ-
ous ones: The important feature that production processes and waste-disposal processes 
are interconnected through the effects which are given outside market transactions is 
fully taken into account and analyzed. Environmentally friendly production, represented 
1 There are also some similarities between the basic model of this paper and a von Neumann model. Refer to Kurz and 
Salvadori (1995) on those similarities.
2 See also Gehrke and Lager (1995) and Lager (1999) as examples of interesting application of a Sraffian model to envi-
ronmental problems.
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by, say, DfE may possibly ease difficulties often accompanied by waste disposal, reduc-
ing the disposal costs. On the other hand, environmentally friendly disposal of waste may 
possibly help production processes become more environmentally friendly by releasing 
the information on proper treatment of waste, which can improve production processes 
in a more environmentally friendly way. These are the things which are happening in an 
actual economy and the points which I would like to emphasize and analyze in this paper.
The structure of this paper is as follows: The next section displays the fundamental 
settings of the paper. A rough sketch of an economy is given as well as the basic assump-
tions and structure of the model, to facilitate the understanding of the general thrust of 
the paper. In the third section, some fundamental mathematical deductions and main 
propositions are demonstrated. In the final section, concluding remarks are made.
2  The basic model and assumptions
2.1  A rough sketch of the model
This subsection develops the basic framework of this paper, giving a rough sketch on a 
whole economy and transactions, based upon which I would like to give a more detailed 
description by means of an abstract model. The precise formulation of the model is given 
in the next subsection.
Let us consider an economy where there are three normal production processes and 
two waste-disposal processes. The first of the normal production processes is one which 
produces a commodity only for input use (the first commodity), inputting itself and 
labor. The other two normal production processes (namely the second and the third pro-
duction processes) are ones which produce a commodity only for consumption use (the 
second commodity), inputting the first commodity and labor. I assume that the second 
and the third production processes produce commodities which are regarded as identi-
cal at the consumption stage.
There is, however, a difference between those production processes which produce the 
second commodity. The second production process is environmentally friendly, so that 
the waste generated through consumption of the commodity produced by the process is 
easily treated by a waste-disposal process at the post-consumption stage. On the other 
hand, the third production process is environmentally unfriendly, so that the waste gen-
erated through consumption of the commodity produced by this process is treated with 
difficulty at the post-consumption stage and more inputs are required than the second 
one for disposal activity. It is assumed that the difference of the two types of waste is 
not identified by households, and thus, they are discharged in a mixed form, without 
separation.
A disposal activity consists of two processes: One is an environmentally friendly dis-
posal process (the fourth process), which disposes of waste without any environmental 
burden (external diseconomy) insofar as it treats the waste of the second commodity 
which is produced by the environmentally friendly production process (the second pro-
cess). If it treats the waste of the second commodity which is produced by the environ-
mentally unfriendly production process (the third process), the disposal activity is 
supposed to create environmental burdens, even if it is an unintentional event.3 For 
3 Here, environmental burdens refer to not only external diseconomy in an ordinary sense, but also other damages such 
as loss of natural capital and so on.
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instance, such a thing happens when an environmentally unfriendly production process 
uses toxic or hazardous substances but does not release proper information on the prod-
uct contents.
The other disposal process is an environmentally unfriendly process, which is activated 
by firms who dispose of waste in an intentionally improper manner. Since this process is 
intentionally utilized for improper disposal or illegal dumping, it does not matter from 
which process the waste originates, the second process or the third process. Intention-
ally improper waste disposal does not care about the information of product contents, 
just disposing of waste in an improper manner.
As a waste treatment activity, I consider only a waste-disposal process: I do not take 
up a recycling process explicitly in this paper. Hence, waste generated through consump-
tion is always treated as bads or dis-commodities. This is because I would like to make 
the model as simple as possible. If one is ready to make a model more complicated, one 
would not find any difficulty for introducing a recycling process to the present model. In 
such an economy, waste may possibly be treated as goods.
Apparently, this is a limitation of this paper. A goods/bads relationship should become 
more important particularly when a dynamic process is taken into account. As Kurz 
(2008) points out, bads or dis-commodities may be turned to goods by innovation, espe-
cially by introduction of a new recycling technology, and it is actually happening in a real 
economy. However, such a dynamic aspect is out of the scope of the present paper, so 
that I would like to eschew the problem.
Considering the above, I would like to emphasize that producers of a consump-
tion commodity and disposal firms may work in an interactive manner out of a market 
boundary on certain conditions as follows. Environmentally friendly producers adopt a 
production process which gives no or little burden to the environment when that com-
modity is properly treated by disposal processes at the post-consumption stage. They 
also release information on the production process, product contents, product compo-
sition and so on in a manual, labeling, an Internet service and other measures. These 
help waste-disposal firms treat the waste in a more efficient and more environmentally 
friendly way, when they want to do so. Completely the opposite can be applicable to 
environmentally unfriendly producers, who do not mind adopting a production process 
which gives an adverse effect to the environment at the post-consumption stage. They 
do not release any information on the production process, product contents, product 
composition and so on. Therefore, the waste created by consumption of the commodity 
produced by these producers is difficult to treat properly and tends to bring about envi-
ronmental problems at the waste-disposal stage.
Next, let me show how disposal firms affect producers of consumption commodities. 
Environmentally friendly waste-disposal firms treat waste in a proper way and give no or 
little burden to the environment. They not only collect the information for completing 
proper disposal but also release it to producers, asking them to produce a more envi-
ronmentally friendly commodity, which is disposed of without difficulty at the post-con-
sumption stage. These strengthen the trend of DfE, encouraging producers to produce a 
more environmentally friendly commodity. It is worth pointing out that this may possi-
bly contribute to the improvement of a production process. Environmentally unfriendly 
disposal firms ignore these and do not contribute to DfE.
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Working in an interactive or collaborative way as mentioned above, environmentally 
friendly producers and disposal firms can contribute to constructing a reproducible 
economy where environmental burdens or environmental costs at the post-consumption 
stage are reduced as much as possible. This type of interaction or collaboration is seen 
between automobile manufacturers and disposal firms of end-of-life vehicles (ELVs). 
Indeed, ACEA (2011) emphasizes this aspect.4 Commission European (2014) also shows 
the importance of such collaboration for enhancing the so-called resource efficiency. 
Enhancement of resource efficiency is supposed to contribute to prompting producers 
to adopt not only economically but also environmentally efficient production processes. 
However, it is worth emphasizing that such interaction or collaboration is possible only 
when a sort of institutional arrangement is made by the authority.
From the above consideration, let me assume the following: As the activity level of 
an environmentally friendly production process increases, environmental burdens or 
environmental costs made by the disposal activity are reduced, since the proportion of 
unintentionally improper disposal of waste also decreases, possibly due to an increase in 
proper information of product contents and so on. It may also be considered that coef-
ficients of an environmentally friendly disposal process decrease as the proportion of an 
environmentally friendly production process to that of an environmentally unfriendly 
production process increases, since more proper information on product contents and 
so on is released and supposed to contribute to improvement of an environmentally 
friendly disposal process.
On the other hand, as the activity level of an environmentally friendly disposal pro-
cess increases, there is more feedback of information on the proper treatment of waste 
from an environmentally friendly disposal process to an environmentally friendly pro-
duction process, so that there is an improvement of production in the process. Surely, 
more information on how one can properly dismantle and treat waste contributes to 
the enhancement of DfE. This also implies that coefficients of the production process 
improve, as the proportion of an environmentally friendly disposal process to an envi-
ronmentally unfriendly disposal process increases.
2.2  Formal description of the model
2.2.1  Production and disposal processes
Having given a rough sketch of the model, let me formally express the technology of this 
economy as follows (see Tables 1, 2):
In Table 1, the first to the third rows describe normal production processes. The first 
row shows a process which produces a commodity for input use (the first commodity). 
The second and the third rows show processes which produce a commodity for con-
sumption use (the second commodity), inputting the first commodity and labor. The dif-
ference between the processes is that the former process is an environmentally friendly 
one, giving less environmental burden than the latter process at the post-consumption 
stage, in the sense that waste created by consumption is smaller in the former process 
than in the latter process.
4 A similar type of interaction can be found between manufacturers of electric appliances and recyclers. See Ueno 
(2004).
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Since the amount of waste generated by consumption of a unit of the commodity pro-
duced by the second process is considered to be smaller than that by the third process, 
thanks to the nature of environmental friendliness as stated above, it is assumed that 
φ2(β) < φ3 always holds for any β, where β denotes an index to express positive effects 
from an environmentally friendly disposal process to an environmentally friendly pro-
duction process, whose formal definition will be given later. If the index increases, DfE 
is promoted, so that the amount of waste originated in the second process becomes 
smaller. I may put φ3 = 1 without loss of generality, and assume that φ2(β) ∈ (0, 1).
The coefficients of inputs of the second process may also depend upon parameter β: 
There is a route of positive effects from an environmentally friendly disposal process to 
an environmentally friendly production process. For instance, as the share of the envi-
ronmentally friendly disposal process increases and accordingly β increases, there is 
more positive feedback of the information to the environmentally friendly production 
process (the second process), say, on how to dismantle and treat ELPs properly. It is also 
possible that the level of collaboration between two actors increases. Then, the possi-
bility for improvement of the production design becomes greater, since this informa-
tion contributes to kaizen or improvement. In this way, environmentally friendly waste 
disposal affects an environmentally friendly production process in an advantageous 
manner.
Yet, it must be noted that an environmentally friendly production process is inferior to 
an environmentally unfriendly one insofar as the private cost structure is concerned, 
since the latter process is never concerned with the environmental burden caused by the 
waste of the commodity which it produced. Therefore, it is natural to suppose that input 
coefficients are larger in the second process than in the third process. Hence, I assume 
that (a2(β), l2(β)) > (a3, l3) holds for any β in Table 1.5
5 I adopt the following notation for vector inequalities. x ≡ (x1, . . . , xn) ≤ y ≡ (y1, . . . , yn) if xi ≤ yi for any i(= 1, . . . , n). 
x ≪ y if xi < yi for any i(= 1, . . . , n). x < y if x ≤ y and x �= y.










I a1 0 l1 → 1 0
II a2(β) 0 l2(β) → 0 1
III a3 0 l3 → 0 1
IV a4(α) 1 l4(α) → 0 0
V a5 1 l5 → 0 0
Table 2 A structure of waste generation
Consumption commodity (II) Consumption commodity (III) Waste generation
1 0 → φ2(β)
0 1 → φ3 (= 1)
Page 7 of 29Hosoda  Economic Structures  (2016) 5:7 
The fourth and the fifth processes are disposal processes which treat waste created by 
consumption. Both processes can treat waste, whichever production process it origi-
nated from. Yet, there is a difference between the two processes as follows. The former 
process is an environmentally friendly disposal process, which does not cause any envi-
ronmental burden insofar as it treats waste whose origin is in the consumption com-
modity produced by the second process (an environmentally friendly production process 
of a consumption commodity). Unintentionally improper disposal is, however, brought 
about by this process, when the waste comes from the consumption commodity which 
is produced by the environmentally unfriendly production process (the third production 
process). This is because proper treatment cannot be made without sufficient informa-
tion on the production process, product contents and so on, which is released by the 
second process, but not by the third process.
The coefficients of inputs of the fourth process are assumed to depend upon param-
eter α, which denotes an index to express positive effects from an environmentally 
friendly production process to an environmentally friendly disposal process, whose for-
mal definition will be given later. As the index increases, the coefficients are supposed to 
decrease. This is because the disposal activity of proper treatment will improve as cir-
cumstances become more favorable for the process.
On the other hand, the fifth process, which is an environmentally unfriendly disposal 
process, is not affected by the index α. Bluntly speaking, it is a disposal process which is 
utilized when improper disposal of waste is intended. Illegal dumping of waste is a typi-
cal example. Thus, it is independent of the index. It must be noted that some inputs are 
indispensable even for intentionally improper disposal: Labor and material inputs are 
required for transportation of waste, secret dumping, concealment of bad behavior and 
so on.
Although I assume that the input coefficients of this process are smaller than those 
of the former disposal process, that is, (a5, l5) < (a4(α), l4(α)) for any α, the gaps may 
be narrow, particularly when policing efforts of the authority are relatively large. Fur-
thermore, the input coefficients (a5, l5) are supposed to be independent of parameter α , 
since positive effects to proper disposal of waste does not matter for the intentionally 
improper disposal activity.
2.2.2  Indices of positive effects between environmentally friendly production and disposal 
processes
Here, I would like to define indices of positive effects between environmentally friendly 
production and disposal processes and explain the environmental burdens given by dis-
posal activities.
As I have already explained in Sect.  2.1, if an activity level of the second process is 
relatively larger than that of the third process, circumstances are more favorable for the 
fourth process, i.e., the environmentally friendly disposal process, thanks to positive 
external effects. Thus, it may be natural to consider that an index of positive effects from 
the second process to the fourth process depends upon the relative degree of two activ-
ity levels, so that α may be expressed as α ≡ α(x2, x3), where xi denotes an activity level 
of the i-th process.
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Particularly, it should be simpler and more convenient if α would be formulated in a 
more specific way as follows:
which is adopted in the following.6
Next, let me define β, which expresses an index of positive effects from the fourth 
process to the second process. As also already explained, circumstances become more 
favorable for the second process as an activity level of the fourth process becomes rela-
tively large compared to that of the fifth process. Thus, β is supposed to depend upon 
(x4, x5), so that β ≡ β(x4, x5) holds.
Particularly, it should be simpler and more convenient if β would be formulated in a 
more specific way as follows:
which is adopted in the following.
In the following, I often use the notations α and β instead of α(x2, x3) and β(x4, x5) for 
simplicity, if there is no room for misunderstanding.7
Now, let me give a formal definition to the environmental cost caused by environmen-
tal burdens made by disposal activities. This consists of two components: One is from 
unintentionally improper disposal of waste, while the other is from intentionally 
improper disposal of waste. Denoting activity levels of the two disposal processes as 
xi (i = 4, 5), the environmental costs made by the latter may be denoted as ps2θ5x5, where 
θ5 is a constant parameter, which shows the environmental burdens per activity. Clearly, 
the environmental costs are expressed in terms of a consumption commodity.8
What about the environmental costs made by the former disposal activity? Con-
sidering that two types of waste are mixed uniformly, it is reasonable to assume that 
{x2φ2(β)/(x2φ2(β)+ x3)}x4 is the amount of waste which is originated by the environ-
mentally friendly production process and treated by the environmentally friendly dis-
posal process. This does not create any environmental burdens.
On the other hand, [1− {x2φ2(β)/(x2φ2(β)+ x3)}]x4 is the amount of waste which 
is originated by the environmentally unfriendly production process and treated by the 
environmentally friendly disposal process. This creates environmental burdens, although 
it is brought about unintentionally. These costs are expressed as
where θ4 is a constant parameter, which shows the environmental burdens per amount 
of the waste treated. The costs are also valued in terms of a consumption commodity. Let 
me assume that θ4 < θ5 holds.
α ≡ α(x2, x3) ≡
x2
x2 + x3
(x2 + x3 �= 0),
6 The functional form can be generalized if some characteristics such as homogenous of degree zero are satisfied. The 
same consideration is applicable to the form of β.
β ≡ β(x4, x5) ≡
x4
x4 + x5
(x4 + x5 �= 0),
7 When I emphasize that α and β depend upon (x2, x3) and (x4, x5), respectively, I use the notation α(x) and β(x).
8 The environmental costs may be valued in terms of any commodity. Yet, it is convenient to express them by a con-
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That having been said, I can define the total environmental costs as follows:
where ψ(x) ≡ {x2φ2(β(x))/(x2φ2(β(x))+ x3)}. I assume that these environmental costs 
appear at the end of disposal activities.
2.2.3  Formal assumptions
In order to promote smooth development of the following analysis, let me enumerate 
the assumptions.




Assumption 2 a′2(β) < 0, l′2(β) < 0 and φ′2(β) < 0.
Assumption 3 (a2(β), l2(β)) > (a3, l3) for β ∈ [0, 1].
Assumption 4 a′4(α) < 0 and l′4(α) < 0.
Assumption 5 (a4(0), l4(0))≫ (a5, l5) and (a4(α), l4(α)) > (a5, l5) for α ∈ [0, 1].
Let me briefly explain the assumptions: Assumption 1 means a feasibility condition of 
the whole economy. This is completely the same as the one which is adopted in a con-
ventional linear production model.
The former part of Assumption 2 roughly means that productivity of an environmen-
tally friendly production process increases as the proportion of an activity level of the 
fourth process to that of the fifth process increases, since positive effects from an envi-
ronmentally friendly disposal process to an environmentally friendly production process 
increase. Also, the amount of waste per consumption of an environmentally friendly 
commodity decreases, since DfE is promoted by an increase in β: This is the latter part of 
Assumption 2.
Assumption 3 implies that productivity of an environmentally friendly production 
process is smaller than that of an environmentally unfriendly production process. Thus, 
the former production process is more costly than the latter for producing a unit of con-
sumption commodity.
Assumption 4 roughly means that productivity of an environmentally friendly disposal 
process increases as the proportion of an activity level of the second process to that of 
the third process increases, since positive effects from an environmentally friendly pro-
duction process to an environmentally friendly disposal process increase. This assump-
tion coupled with Assumption 2 means that there are positive interactive effects between 
environmentally friendly production and disposal processes.
Assumption 5 is a comparison of productivity between environmentally friendly 
and unfriendly disposal processes. The former part mentions that if the index of posi-
tive effects defined by α is zero, productivity of the former disposal process in terms of 
both material and labor inputs is smaller than that of the latter, or in other words, costs 
of the former disposal process are larger than those of the latter. This is quite a natural 
assumption: Intentionally improper disposal is made because it is less costly than proper 
ps2θ4{1− ψ(x)}x4 + p
s
2θ5x5,
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treatment of waste, and this situation is quite likely when there is no environmentally 
friendly circumstance for proper treatment of waste. The latter part of Assumption 5 
says that productivity of the former disposal process, in terms of material and labor 
input, is not greater than that of the latter process, but either material productivity or 
labor productivity is smaller in the former process. This is not an artificial assumption, 
either.
2.3  Quantity and price formations
In this subsection, I define quantity systems as well as price systems which must hold 
in the long run. I present a sustainable equilibrium, a market equilibrium and a socially 
optimal equilibrium in order.
2.3.1  Sustainable equilibrium
First, let me start from the formulation of a quantity system in a long-run competitive 
equilibrium as follows:
and
where g and xi (i = 1, . . . , 5) are a growth rate and an activity level of each process, 
respectively, and (ps1, ps2, ps3,ws) is a vector of the production prices and the wage rate, 
which are formulated later in a dual system.
The first and second equalities of (1) show supply-demand balances for circulating 
capital and consumption commodities, while the third equality is a supply-demand bal-
ance for waste disposal. Incidentally, 0 < c ≤ x2 + x3 means non-triviality of a solution. 
It must be noted that two types of waste are discharged in a mixed form by households, 
since the difference is assumed to be unidentified by them. The last inequality is a labor 
constraint. Equality system (2) means that the value of supply equals that of demand for 
each commodity, disposal and labor.
Although inequality system (1) coupled with equality system (2) seems to allow free 
disposal, it does not actually. This is because c = x2 + x3 holds by definition, so that this 
(in)equality may be dropped.
Inequality system (1) and equality system (2) are expressed in matrix form as follows:




(1+ g){a1x1 + a2(β)x2 + a3x3 + a4(α)x4 + a5x5} ≤ x1
0 < c ≤ x2 + x3
{φ2(β)x2 + x3} ≤ (1+ g)(x4 + x5)














3 = (1+ g)(x4 + x5)p
s
3�
l1x1 + l2(β)x2 + l3x3 + l4(α)x4 + l5x5
�
ws = lws,
(3)A(g ,α,β)x ≤ L and psA(g ,α,β)x = psL,
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respectively.9
Now, let me refer to a dual system to (1):
and
where r is a profit rate. In the following, I assume g = r for simplicity.
It must be noted that a base of valuation, namely numeraire, must be chosen in order to 
determine relative prices. I adopt the consumption commodity as numeraire, setting 
ps2 = 1. This implies that the environmental costs are valued in terms of this commodity.10
The above inequality and equality relationships, namely (4) and (5), are simply written 
in matrix form as follows:
It must be noted that �(ψ) is defined as �(ψ) ≡ (0, 1, 1,−θ4(1− ψ),−θ5).
The first inequality of (4) means a cost-price balance in a circulating capital commod-
ity production process, while the second and the third mean cost-price balances in con-
sumption commodity production processes. The difference between the former and the 
latter is that the waste-disposal costs are reflected in the left-hand sides of the second 
and the third inequalities as the terms φ2(β)ps3 and ps3, although there is no such term 
in the left-hand side of the first inequality. Here, ps3 is interpreted as the price of waste 
treatment service, and not that of bads or a dis-commodity, which is expressed as −ps3.
The fourth and the fifth inequalities of (4) mean cost-price balances in waste-disposal 
processes. There are two terms which are not found in other inequalities: The first is the 
A(g ,α,β) ≡

 (1+ g)a1 − 1 (1+ g)a2(β) (1+ g)a3 (1+ g)a4(α) (1+ g)a50 φ2(β) 1 − (1+ g) − (1+ g)








, x ≡ (x1, x2, . . . , x5)T and ps ≡ (ps1, ps3,ws)







































































































10 Obviously, what is adopted as numeraire does not affect the price and quantity systems essentially, since only relative 
valuation matters.
(6)psA(r,α,β) ≥ �(ψ) and psA(r,α,β)x = �(ψ)x.
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term −ps3 in the left-hand sides of the inequalities. This term reflects a negative cost or 
positive revenue for disposal activity services at the beginning of disposal activities. The 
second is the term which shows environmental costs, i.e., −θ4(1− ψ) and −θ5, in the 
right-hand side of the inequalities. These costs are expressed in terms the consumption 
commodity. Thus, the environmental costs caused by the waste-disposal activities are 
internalized. It might be easier to understand the cost-price balances if terms are trans-
posed, say in the case of the fourth inequality, as follows:
Notice that environmental costs appear at the end of waste-disposal activities and the 
revenue for waste-disposal services appears at the beginning of the activities.
The meaning of (5) is clear: Any process which produces deficits is not activated in a 
long run. Inequality system (4) coupled with equality system (5) shows a constellation of 
production prices for sustainability, since waste-disposal costs as well as environmental 
costs are fully taken into account. Under the assumption that g equals r, clearly A(g ,α,β) 
coincides with A(r,α,β), so that the duality between (3) and (6) is clear. Yet, since α 
and β as well as ψ are dependent upon x, the duality is different from the one which is 
expressed by the conventional linear programming problems: The systems expressed by 
(3) and (6) are nonlinear.
Let me explain the significance of the dual system formulated by (1) with (2) and (4) 
with (5). First, in this system, the waste treatment costs are reflected in the production 
of the consumption commodity, from which waste is produced at the post-consumption 
stage. This is the result of the dual nature between the quantity and price inequalities. 
Second, environmental costs caused by the waste treatment are expressed in the price 
inequalities, so that the environmental costs are internalized. Third, the dual system 
expresses the reproducibility of an economy in a steady state as the conventional linear 
inequality models. Summing up, I may say that the dual system guarantees the reproduc-
ibility of an economy with environmental consideration. Thus, let me call the equilib-
rium defined by (1) with (2) and (4) with (5) a sustainable equilibrium.
Obviously, a sustainable equilibrium is different from a market equilibrium, which is 
defined in the next subsection. It is also different from an equilibrium obtained by maxi-
mization of the net social benefits, although it may coincide with a sustainable equilib-
rium on certain conditions, as shown later.
2.3.2  Market equilibrium
Let me formulate a market equilibrium in the long run and give a specific meaning to it 
in the present paper. To do so, I would like to mention the fact that waste is discharged 
by household consumption activity. Hence, presumably it is legitimate to consider that 
waste belongs to households, as might be understood in daily life. Then, it is households 
who have to pay for waste disposal, in whichever form they are charged—a disposal tax 
or a disposal charge. In the present paper, I assume the latter form: Household waste is 
transacted between households and disposal firms, so that the former has to pay a dis-
posal charge to the latter. The charge is assumed to be determined in a competitive way.
(1+ r)a4(α)p
s





1 + θ5 + wl5 ≥ (1+ r)p
s
3.
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Even under this specification, the supply-demand balances in the long run are the same 
as those in a sustainable equilibrium. The cost-price relationship in a market equilibrium 
is, however, quite different from those expressed in (4) and (5). It is expressed as follows:
and
In matrix form, the above expressions are written as follows:
where A˜(r,α,β) and ˜ are defined as








Clearly in a market equilibrium, environmental costs are not reflected in the cost-price 
relationship of disposal processes. Without any constraint on environmental burdens, 
those environmental costs are never taken into account by waste-disposal firms. Waste 
treatment costs do not appear in the cost-price relationship of the production processes 
of a consumption commodity, either. This is because the waste is discharged by house-
holds and the treatment charges are on them. Summing up, although environmental 
costs are not internalized in a market transaction, waste treatment costs are internalized 
and paid by households instead of producers in a market equilibrium.
To determine relative prices and a wage rate in the above, a commodity or labor must 
be chosen as numeraire. Since the choice of numeraire does not matter for the relative 
price determination, I may adopt the consumption commodity as numeraire as before.
Let me make a remark on the payment for waste disposal. Since the waste-disposal 
charges are supposed to be paid by a household,

















































































(9)pmA˜(r,α,β) ≥ �˜ and pmA˜(r,α,β)x = �˜x,

 (1+ r)a1 − 1 (1+ r)a2(β) (1+ r)a3 (1+ r)a4(α) (1+ r)a50 0 0 − (1+ r) − (1+ r)
l1 l2(β) l3 l4(α) l5

 and (0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0)
(10)w




2 + {αφ2(β)+ (1− α)}cp
m
3








= c{αφ2(β)+ (1− α)}
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holds. Equation (10) is nothing but a household budget constraint. On the other hand, 
the constraint in a sustainable equilibrium is
since the waste-disposal charges are paid in advance by producers, not by households. 
Another difference between (10) and (11) is that environmental costs are paid back to 
households in a sustainable equilibrium, whereas they are not to any actor in a market 
equilibrium.
It is worth pointing out that the supply-demand balance of a market equilibrium is 
expressed by means of A˜(r,α,β). Indeed, it is
where L˜ is defined as
As before, it is assumed that r = g and c = x2 + x3 hold. It is easy to understand that (9) 
and (12) make a duality.
2.3.3  Socially optimal equilibrium
Finally, in this section, I would like to define a socially optimal equilibrium, where the 
net social benefits are maximized. Notice that I have not referred to any maximization 
problem so far.
The net social benefits are defined as consumption which is expressed as x2 + x3 minus 
the environmental costs which are expressed θ4(1− ψ)x4 + θ5x5. Notice that environ-
mental costs are expressed in terms of a consumption commodity. Hence, the net social 
benefits expressed as
is also expressed in terms of a consumption commodity.
Then, a socially optimal solution can be obtained by solving
3  Main results
In this section, let me show the main results: Existence of equilibria and their character-
istics. I would also like to compare three types of equilibria, namely a sustainable equi-
librium, a market equilibrium and a socially optimal equilibrium.
3.1  Existence of equilibria
If there were no equilibrium solution, it should be nonsense to talk about the character-
istics of solutions and relationships among equilibria. Thus, first, I show the fundamen-
tal existence propositions as follows:
(11)w
sl = cps2 − {θ4(1− ψ)x4 + θ5x5},
(12)A˜(r,α,β)x ≤ L˜ and pmA˜(r,α,β)x = pmL˜,
L˜ ≡





x2 + x3 − {θ4(1− ψ(x))x4 + θ5x5} = �(ψ(x))x.
(13)max�(ψ(x))x s.t. A(g ,α(x),β(x))x ≤ L.
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Proposition 1 There is a solution to (3) and (6), and so a sustainable equilibrium exists.
Proof See “Appendix 1.”  
Proposition 2 There is a solution to (9) and (12), and so a market equilibrium exists.
Proof See “Appendix 1.”  
As for the socially optimal equilibrium, it is obvious that there exists an equilibrium 
solution. This is because constraint (13) is feasible and the maxim and is a continuous 
function of x.
3.2  Characteristics of equilibria
Next, let me consider characteristics of equilibria. First, consider a sustainable equilib-
rium. Since the second process is an environmentally friendly production process and 
the fourth process is an environmentally friendly disposal process, it might be thought 
that they should be activated instead of the third process and the fifth process, which are 
environmentally unfriendly and jointly bring about environmental burdens.
This is not true in a general case. If the coefficient of environmental costs is very small, 
it may be reasonable to activate the fifth process, since it is less costly than the fourth 
process. Moreover, the third process may be activated when β is not so large, due to 
Assumption 3.
Yet, it is expected that the third and the fifth processes are not activated if environ-
mental costs caused by improper treatment of waste are so large, whether it is inten-
tional or not. Actually, this expectation is correct as follows:
Proposition 3 In a sustainable equilibrium, x∗3 and x∗5 go to zero as θ4 and θ5 go to 
infinity.
Proof See “Appendix 2.”  
From the argument of continuity, it is known that x∗3 and x∗5 are sufficiently small if 
θi (i = 4, 5) is sufficiently large. Thus, if environmental costs caused by improper treat-
ment of waste are very large, the environmentally unfriendly production process and 
disposal process are not activated in a sustainable equilibrium.
It is natural to expect to obtain a different result from the above in a market equilib-
rium, where environmental costs are not reflected in the cost-price relationship. Actu-
ally, I can show the following result:
Proposition 4 In a market equilibrium, xm∗2 = xm∗4 = 0.
Proof See “Appendix 2.”  
The message of this proposition is clear: Without any constraint upon environmental 
burdens, both environmentally friendly production and disposal processes are knocked 
out, and only environmentally unfriendly production and disposal processes remain 
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in an economy. Therefore, there are no positive interactive effects between production 
and disposal processes. This is a natural result which comes from the cost-minimizing 
principle and should be compared to that of Proposition 3. As I show later, extended 
producer responsibility realizes the sustainable equilibrium, so that it internalizes the 
external diseconomy partly. Furthermore, under certain conditions, it internalizes the 
external diseconomy completely, realizing the social optimum.
It must be noted that Proposition 3 requires the condition that θi (i = 4, 5) goes to 
infinity or is sufficiently large. Let me consider the opposite case, i.e., the case in which 
θi (i = 4, 5) is very small. The extreme case is when θi (i = 4, 5) is zero. I can show the 
following:
Proposition 5 Suppose θi (i = 4, 5) is sufficiently small, so that it is close to zero. Then, 
x∗4 = 0 and x∗5 > 0 in a sustainable equilibrium. Furthermore, (1) if l1 is sufficiently small 
and the rate of profit is close to its maximum (=1/a1 − 1) or (2) if both |a2(0)− a3| and 
|l2(0)− l3| are sufficiently small, then, x∗2 > 0 and x∗3 = 0, and thus, α∗ = 1 in a sustain-
able equilibrium.
Proof See “Appendix 2.”  
Hence, an environmentally friendly production process may remain in an economy 
and an environmentally unfriendly production process may be knocked out even if 
environmental costs are sufficiently small in a sustainable equilibrium. Yet, in the same 
circumstances, an environmentally friendly disposal process disappears whereas an 
environmentally unfriendly disposal process is activated. The effect of the magnitude of 
environmental costs is asymmetrical between production and disposal processes.
3.3  Comparison of equilibria
In this subsection, I would like to compare equilibria in terms of net social benefits. 
First, let me compare the net social benefits in a sustainable equilibrium and those in a 
market equilibrium. Although the following proposition may seem obvious, it is not. In a 
sustainable equilibrium, external costs are internalized, but not in the optimal way. Thus, 
it must be proved rigorously anyhow:
Proposition 6 The net welfare in a sustainable equilibrium is not smaller than that in a 
market equilibrium.
Proof From Proposition 4, we know αm∗ = βm∗ = 0. Thus, we have
from Assumption 2. Furthermore, from Assumption 4, we know that the following 
holds:
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which means




≤ L, thanks to (14), 
and since
holds.  
It is interesting to see that I have not utilized Assumptions 2 and 4 which express 
positive interactive effects between the second and fourth processes to prove the above 
proposition. Even without these effects, the net social benefits in a sustainable equilib-
rium are not smaller than those in a market equilibrium, due to the nature of a sustain-
able equilibrium.
It is clear that the net social benefits in a sustainable equilibrium are not larger than 
those in a socially optimal equilibrium by definition, so that we have
where ψ(x∗∗) corresponds to the socially optimal solution.
Then, a natural question would be this: In what condition are the net social benefits in 
a sustainable equilibrium larger than those in a market equilibrium and hopefully equal 
to those in a socially optimal equilibrium? I can answer this question as follows:
Proposition 7 If externality represented by coefficient θ5 is sufficiently large, then 
the net social benefits in a sustainable equilibrium are larger than those in a market 
equilibrium.
Proof By the nature of duality, the net social benefits in a sustainable equilibrium can-
not be negative, so that �(ψ(x∗))x∗ ≥ 0 holds.11 On the other hand, due to Proposition 
4, we have
Notice that xm∗ does not depend upon θ5, and xm∗5  is calculated as
Thus, �(ψ(xm∗)) becomes negative as θ5 becomes sufficiently large. Hence, 
�(ψ(x∗))x∗ > �(ψ(xm∗)) for sufficiently large θ5.  
Next, let me consider the case in which θ5 is sufficiently small, or the case in which 
environmental costs caused by waste disposal are negligible. I can show the following 
proposition, which corresponds to Proposition 5:
�(ψ∗)x∗ ≥ �(ψ∗)xm∗ ≥ �(ψm∗)xm∗,
�(ψm∗) = �(0) ≡ (0, 1, 1,−θ ,−θ) ≤ (0, 1, 1,−θ(1− ψ∗),−θ) ≡ �(ψ(x∗))
�(ψ(xm∗)) ≤ �(ψ(x∗)) ≤ �(ψ(x∗∗)),
11 Actually, this is positive, as shown in the proof of Proposition 1.
















(1+ g)l3 + l5
} > 0.
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Proposition 8 Suppose both l1 and θ5 are sufficiently small, and the rate of profit is close 









then �(ψ(x∗))x∗ > �(ψ(xm∗))xm∗.
Proof See “Appendix 3.” 
What does the above proposition mean? It must be noted that
means that more inputs are required for waste treatment if the third process, instead of 
the second process, is activated for production of a consumption commodity.12 Since l1 
is assumed to be very small, the wage rate is not so small even if the rate of profit is close 
to its maximum. Considering these together, activation of the third process instead of 
the second one is too costly when the waste treatment costs are taken into account. 
Therefore, the net social benefits in a sustainable equilibrium are larger than those in a 
market equilibrium.
Finally, I would like to demonstrate the condition in which a sustainable equilib-
rium coincides with a socially optimal equilibrium for given environmental burdens 
θi(i = 4, 5). Namely, we have
Proposition 9 A sustainable equilibrium coincides with a socially optimal equilibrium, 
(i) if both θ4 and θ5 are sufficiently large or (ii) if |aj − ai(0)| < ε and |lj − li(0)| < ε holds 
for sufficiently small ε, where (i, j) = (2, 3) and (4, 5), respectively.
Proof See “Appendix 4.”  
4  Discussion
Here, I would like to consider the significance of a sustainable equilibrium in the context 
of producer’s responsibility for waste generation. Notice that waste treatment charges 
are included in production costs in this equilibrium. Of course, the waste treatment 
charges are reflected in the price of the consumption commodity. Thus, although house-
holds do not have to pay for waste treatment directly, they pay indirectly, since those 
costs are reflected in the production price. In other words, households are supposed pay 
for waste treatment of an ELP (end-of-life product) in advance when they buy the rel-
evant commodity or product.
This way of payment for waste treatment is interpreted as an application of extended 
producer responsibility (EPR), which was proposed by OECD. Precisely speaking, it is 
financial EPR, since producers have to take waste treatment costs into account in their 
production, accepting the financial burden for waste treatment, although they are not 
responsible for waste treatment activities.








12 This inequality implies that {1− φ2(0)}a5 ≡ {φ3 − φ2(0)}a5 > (1+ g){a2(0)− a3} and 
{1− φ2(0)}l5 ≡ {φ3 − φ2(0)}l5 > (1+ g){l2(0)− l3} hold.
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Considering the above, it is clear that a sustainable equilibrium has a special meaning 
as an application of EPR in the field of an environmental policy. Since the concept of a 
sustainable equilibrium is very close to that of the natural price or production price sys-
tem, it may be said that the classical concept of prices has very important meaning in an 
environmental policy.
The importance of the classical concept of a price system is quite naturally understood, 
since the concept is based upon reproducibility of an economic system. If the concept is 
extended so that environmental restrictions are taken into account, it may be interpreted 
as sustainability of an economic system. This tells us that the classical concept of a price 
system is still applicable to a quite modern environmental problem.
5  Concluding remarks
In this paper, interactive aspects between environmentally friendly producers and dis-
posal firms are emphasized and analyzed. Although this interaction does not appear in a 
market equilibrium in which waste treatment charges are on households while environ-
mental costs are not internalized in the production, it does appear in a specific type of 
equilibrium which is defined as a sustainable equilibrium in this paper.
A sustainable equilibrium is defined based upon the idea of a classical type of produc-
tion price or natural price system. A difference between a sustainable equilibrium and a 
classical equilibrium is that environmental factors are explicitly taken into account in the 
former equilibrium.
I have also demonstrated that the net social benefits of a sustainable equilibrium 
are between those of a market equilibrium and a socially optimal equilibrium. In spe-
cial cases, the net social benefits in a sustainable equilibrium are larger than those in a 
market equilibrium. Moreover, a sustainable equilibrium coincides with a socially opti-
mal equilibrium, when external diseconomy caused by waste treatment services is suf-
ficiently large, or when the relative cost structures in physical terms are not different 
between environmentally friendly and unfriendly production processes and between 
environmentally friendly and unfriendly waste treatment processes.
To demonstrate these results, I have utilized Assumptions 2 and 4, which express 
positive interactive effects between environmentally friendly producers and disposal 
firms. These effects are created by their collaboration or cooperation whether it may 
be systematically organized or not. I may say that the present model captures the new 
trend of collaboration or cooperation between producers and disposal firms which has 
recently appeared, say in ELV recycling, and shows how it is strengthened in a sustain-
able equilibrium.
The concept of a sustainable equilibrium, which is akin to the classical concept of 
natural prices or production prices, can be interpreted as an application of EPR. In this 
sense, the classical concept of natural prices or production prices has wide applicability 
to environmental problems. I believe that it is my contribution to the modern classical 
economics that I demonstrate this result.
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Appendix 1
Proof  of  Proposition  1 First, I prove that (3) and (6) have a non-trivial solution for 
Lq ≡ (0, q, l)
T instead of L, where q is a positive number. Next, I show that there is a 
non-trivial solution for q = 0.
Part 1. Step 1. Let me define a set X as
which is compact and convex. Let me also define functions αǫ(x), βǫ(x) and ψǫ(x) as
where ǫ is a sufficiently small positive constant. Thus, αǫ(x), βǫ(x) and ψǫ(x) are well 
defined for any x ∈ X.
Choose x′ ∈ X, and assign it to αǫ(x), βǫ(x) and ψǫ(x), which are denoted as 
α′ǫ ≡ αǫ(x










, respectively. Assign 
(α′ǫ ,β
′
ǫ) and ψ ′ǫ to A(g ,αǫ ,βǫ)(≡ A(r,αǫ ,βǫ)) and �(ψǫ).
Then, we can consider the following linear programming problems:
Apparently, (D′) is dual to (O′).
We can find (ε, 0, 0, 0, 0)T such that ε is positive and sufficiently small, and
is satisfied. This means that (O′) is feasible.
Next, choose sufficiently large positive δ,
which means (D′) is feasible.
The above argument shows that both (O′) and (D′) are feasible, so that both problems 
have solutions for pre-assigned x′ (Gale 1960, p. 78).
Step 2. Denoting the solution set of x as X∗ǫ (x′), we know that there is a correspond-
ence  such that
Since (O′) is linear for given x′, any convex combination of solutions is a solution to (O′) , 
so that X∗ǫ (x′) is convex. Moreover, it is bounded, since X∗ǫ (x′) ⊂ X. Clearly, it is closed, 
so that X∗ǫ (x′) is compact.




 such that 
x′ν ∈ X and x′ν → x′0. Then, we can choose a sequence x∗ν such that x∗ν ∈ X∗ǫ (x′ν) and 
x∗ν → x
∗
0 as ν →∞. By construction, x∗0 is a solution to (O′) for x′0, and so x∗0 ∈ X∗ǫ (x′0) . 
X ≡
{





x2 + x3 + ǫ
, βǫ(x) ≡
x4
x4 + x5 + ǫ
and ψǫ(x) ≡
φ2(βǫ(x))x2
φ2(βǫ(x))x2 + x3 + ǫ
,
{




ǫ)x ≤ Lq (O
′)










ǫ)(ε, 0, 0, 0, 0)
T =

 {(1+ g)a1 − 1}ε0
l1ε







(0, 0, δ)A(r,α′ǫ ,β
′









� : x′ ∈ X �→ X∗ǫ (x
′) ∈ X .
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Otherwise, in the neighborhood of x∗0, �(ψ ′ǫ)x∗ν < p∗νLǫ should hold, where p∗ν corre-
sponds to x∗ν. But this is a contradiction. Hence,  is upper-hemi-continuous.
Thanks to Kakutani’s fixed point theorem, we know that ∃x∗ǫ ∈ X∗ǫ (x∗ǫ ) such that
where α∗ǫ ≡ α(x∗ǫ ), β∗ǫ ≡ β(x∗ǫ ), and ψ∗ǫ ≡ ψ(x∗ǫ ).
Clearly, the dual system (D′) has a solution, corresponding to x∗ǫ: ∃p∗ǫ > 0 such that




 is in a compact set X, the sequence has an accumu-
lation point x∗∗ ∈ X, which must be a solution to (3). A price vector p∗∗ which corre-
sponds to x∗∗ must also be a solution to (6).
Step 3. Let me show non-triviality of an equilibrium solution. For any given 
(α,β ,ψ) ∈ [0, 1] × [0, 1] × [0, 1], consider the following problem:





as well as x2 ≤ q/φ2(β) and l1x1 + l2(β)x2 + l3x3 + l4(α)x4 + l5x5 ≤ l. Thus, the above 
problem is feasible, and �(ψ)x > 0. Consequently, the maximum value of the above 
problem is positive and a continuous function of (α,β ,ψ). Clearly, it has a posi-
tive lower bound. This implies that �(ψǫ) never converges to zero as ǫ → 0. Hence, 
x∗2 + x
∗
3 > 0.  
Part 2. Now, let me show that (3) and (6) have a solution when q equals zero. From 
the above argument, we know that x∗2 + x∗3 > 0 holds for any positive q. Suppose that q 
converges to zero, and that x∗ has an accumulation point such that x2 + x3 = 0. Then, 
x∗2 + x
∗
3 must be sufficiently small for sufficiently small q.
Case 1. φ2(β)x∗2 + x∗3 < (1+ g)(x∗4 + x∗5)+ q.
Then, p3 = 0 holds. Thus,
hold. Therefore, at least one of ps1 and ws is positive. 
1. Suppose ps1 > 0 and ws > 0. From Assumption 3, 
 holds, so that x∗2 = 0, and so ψ(x∗) = 0 hold. Since �(x∗) ≡ x∗3 − θ4x∗4 − θ5x∗5 must 
be positive, we know that x∗4 and x∗5 must be sufficiently small. Notice that 
 holds, since ws > 0 holds by hypothesis. Thus, x∗1 is relatively large compared to 
xi (i = 2, . . . , 5), and x∗1 ∼= l/l1. But this means 
 from which we have ps1 = 0. A contradiction.





ǫ ≤ Lq and�(ψ
∗
ǫ )x









ǫ ) ≥ �(ψ
∗
ǫ ) and p
∗




ǫ ) ≤ �(ψ
∗
ǫ ).
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 holds, so that we have x∗1 = 0. A contradiction.
3. Suppose ws = 0 and p∗1 > 0. We have 
 A contradiction.
Case 2. φ(β)x∗2 + x∗3 = (1+ g)(x∗4 + x∗5)+ q.
Since x∗2 + x∗3 is sufficiently small, x∗4 + x∗5 is also sufficiently small. 
1. Suppose 
holds. Then, ws = 0, and so ps1 = 0hold. From the second and third inequalities of (4), 
we have
which implies that x∗3 = 0 and x∗2 > 0.From the fourth and fifth inequalities of (4),
holds. Hence, we have x∗4 > 0 and x∗5 = 0, so that we know β(x∗) = 1. Therefore, we 
have ψ(x∗) = 1. On the other hand, from the above inequality and ψ(x∗) = 1, we 
have −(1+ r)ps3 ≥ 0, which implies ps3 ≤ 0. A contradiction.
2. Suppose 
 holds. Then, x∗1 ∼= l/l1, and xi (i = 2, . . . , 5) is sufficiently small. Thus,
holds, so that ps1 = 0 holds. Therefore, ws = 0 holds: Otherwise,
and so x∗1 = 0 hold. A contradiction. Hence, we have ws = 0. Now, we can apply the 
same argument as in Case 2 (ii) above to the present case.  
 
Proof of Proposition 2 Notice that (9) and (12) are equivalent to




3 , 1+ p
m
3 , 0, 0
)
.
First, let me show that wm is bounded. Suppose that wm is sufficiently large. Then, 
from the first inequality of (7) and the first equality of (8), we have xm1 = 0, and so 
xm2 = · · · = x
m




i = 0 < l and 
thus, wm = 0 holds. A contradiction.
Let me denote an upper bound of wm as w¯m. Then, the following must hold:





























































pmA(r,α,β) ≥ �ˆ(β , pm3 ) and p
mA(r,α,β)x = �ˆ(β , pm3 )x
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from which we know
where R ≡ 1/a1 − 1.
From the fifth inequality of the price inequality system in (15), we have
which implies
Then, define Pm3  as
and choose (x′T , p′m3 ) ∈ X × Pm3 , assigning it to A(r,α,β) and ˆ. Solve
which is equivalent to
Both problems of (16) are feasible, so that they are solvable: They have solutions x and 





∈ X × Pm3 . Hence, we have correspondence 
 such that





. From the same argument in the 
proof of Proposition 1, we know that  is an upper-hemi-continuous correspondence, 
whose image is clearly compact and convex. Consequently,
Thus,






































A(g ,α(x′),β(x′))x ≤ L







x s.t. A(g ,α(x′),β(x′))x ≤ L
































s.t. A(g ,α(x∗),β(x∗))x ≤ L
and
p∗m minimizes pmL
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 is a solution. Non-triviality of an equilibrium solution is 
obvious.  
Appendix 2
Proof  of  Proposition  3 Suppose there are positive lower bounds for x∗3 and x∗5 as 
θi →∞ (i = 4, 5). Denote them as x¯3 and x¯5, respectively.
Consider a sequence {θν} ≡ {(θ4ν , θ5ν)} such that θiν →∞ as ν →∞. Since X is a 




 which is a solution corresponding to θν 
such that x∗3ν → x¯3 and x∗5ν → x¯5. Then, we have










 and ψ∗ν → ψ¯ < 1, since x¯∗3 is assumed to be 
positive.
This, however, contradicts that the above is the maximized value, which cannot be 
negative.  
Proof of Proposition 4 From the second inequality of (7) and pm∗1 = 1, we know that at 
least one of the pm∗1  and wm∗ is positive. Let me show that both pm∗1  and wm∗ are positive. 
If wm∗ > 0 = pm∗1  holds,
holds, so that xm∗1 = 0 holds. But this contradicts non-triviality of a solution. If 
0 = wm∗ < pm∗1  holds, we have
A contradiction. Thus, both pm∗1  and wm∗ are positive.
Then, from the second and third inequalities of (7), we have
due to Assumption 3, so that xm∗2 = 0. Applying the same argument to the fourth and 
fifth inequalities of (7), we have xm∗4 = 0.  
Proof of Proposition 5 Look at the right-hand side of the fourth and fifth inequalities of 
(4). Since θi is assumed to be sufficiently small, we know that x∗4 = 0 and x∗5 > 0, so that 
β∗ = 0, due to Assumption 5.

















m∗ > pm∗1 = 0
0 = l1w
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Substitute this into the second and third inequalities of (4) and take β∗ = 0 into account. 
Then, we have
where a strict equality must hold in either inequality above. Hence, if the left-hand side 
of the first inequality above is smaller than that in the second, then the second produc-
tion process is chosen for commodity production. If the inequality sign is the opposite, 
then the third process is chosen. In the former case, we have x∗2 > 0 and x∗3 = 0, while 
we have x∗2 = 0 and x∗3 > 0 in the latter case.
Considering θ5 ∼= 0, if
holds, the former case is valid. Clearly, this holds when both l1 and {1− (1+ r)a1} are 
sufficiently small, since the right-hand side is sufficiently small and close to zero. The 
same is true if both |a2(0)− a3| and |l2(0)− l3| are sufficiently small. Thus, the proposi-
tion follows.  
Appendix 3
Proof of Proposition 8 Due to Proposition 5, we have
from which we can obtain the following:
On the other hand, considering Proposition 4, we can calculate
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(1+ g)l3 + l5
} l.
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Hence, if
holds, we have x∗2 > xm∗3 . Therefore, due to Proposition 5,
if θ5 is sufficiently small.  
Appendix 4
Proof of Proposition 9 Denote each production and disposal process as k = I , II . . . ,V . 
Then, production techniques are expressed by {I , II, IV}, {I , II,V }, {I , III, IV} and {I , III,V } , 
respectively, and they are labeled as {i}, {ii}, . . . , {iv}. Let me calculate the price of the 
consumption commodity of the sustainable equilibrium in terms of the wage rate, which 
corresponds to each technique.
First, it must be noted that θ4 and θ5 are coefficients of environmental burdens and 
independent of choice of technique. Furthermore, ps1/ws is also independent of choice of 
technique by construction, so that
holds, where z{i} (k = i, . . . , iv) shows a variable z obtained in an economy of a {k}-tech-




){k} simply as (ps1/ws) for k = 1, . . . , iv.
Now, consider the production technique {i} (that is, {I , II, IV}), where the price of a 
consumption commodity in a sustainable equilibrium is denoted ps{i}2 . It is easily calcu-
lated as
In the same way, for {I , II,V }, {I , III, IV} and {I , III,V }, we have
{
(1+ g)a2(0)+ φ2(0)a5 < (1+ g)a3 + a5
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and
From the above calculation, we have
Therefore, there exists sufficiently small positive ε such that, if |aj − ai(0)| < ε and 
|lj − li(0)| < ε hold, then (1/ws){k} > (1/ws){i} holds for k = ii, iii, iv, where (i, j) = (2, 3) 
and (4, 5). Clearly, if θi (i =, 4, 5) is sufficiently large, (1/ws){k} > (1/ws){i} also holds for 
k = ii, iii, iv.
Then, the techniques {ii}, {iii} and {iv} are less profitable than the technique {i}, so that 
the former techniques are not adopted. Yet, it might be considered that a certain combi-
nation of those techniques could be equi-profitable. Such a situation never occurs, since 
the above procedure is still valid with minor modifications such as 0 < α < 1, 0 < β < 0 
and 0 < ψ < 1.
Moreover, if |aj − ai(0)| < ε and |lj − li(0)| < ε hold, clearly |aj − ai(h)| < ε and 
|lj − li(h)| < ε hold for (i, j, h) = (2, 3,β) and (4, 5,α). Thus, I have shown the following 
lemma:  
Lemma 1 (i) If θi (i = 4, 5) is sufficiently large or (ii) if |aj − ai(0)| < ε and 
|lj − li(0)| < ε holds for sufficiently small ε, where (i, j) = (2, 3) and (4, 5), respectively, then 
(ps2/w
s){k} = (1/ws){k} > (1/ws){i} = (ps2/w
s){i} for k = ii, iii, iv holds.
Thus, the production technique {i} (that is, {I , II, IV}) is chosen in a sustainable 
equilibrium.
Next, let me consider the Lagrangean of (13) as follows:
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must hold for i = 1, . . . , 5.
Thus, we have
Hence, if |a2(β)− a3| < ǫ1 and |l2(β)− l3| < ǫ1 for sufficiently small ǫ1 and for all 
(α,β) ∈ [0, 1] × [0, 1], then L2 > L3 holds, which implies x2 > 0, x3 = 0 and ψ = 1. 
Thus, the first and third terms of L4 − L5 equal zero. Consequently, if |a4(α)− a5| < ǫ2 
and |l4(α)− l5| < ǫ2 for sufficiently small ǫ2 and for all (α,β) ∈ [0, 1] × [0, 1], then 
L4 > L5 holds. The same argument follows when θi (i = 1, 2) is sufficiently large. There-
fore, we have the following result:
Lemma 2 (i) If θi (i = 4, 5) is sufficiently large or (ii) if |aj − ai(0)| < ǫ and |lj − li(0)| < ǫ 
holds for sufficiently small ǫ, where (i, j) = (2, 3) and (4, 5), respectively, then x∗∗3 = 0 and 
x∗∗5 = 0.







































































































































Page 29 of 29Hosoda  Economic Structures  (2016) 5:7 
Received: 9 July 2015   Accepted: 3 February 2016
References
ACEA (2011) ACEA position on dismantling of end‑of‑life vehicles by non‑authorized treatment operators. European 
Automobile Manufacturer’s Association
European Commission (2014) European resource efficiency platform. Manifesto and Policy Recommendation, European 
Commission
Franke R (1986) Some problems concerning the notion of cost‑minimizing systems in the framework of joint production. 
Manch Sch LIV(3):298–307
Fujimoto T, Opocher A (2010) Commodity content in a general input–output model. Metroeconomica 61(3):442–453
Gale D (1960) The theory of linear economic models. McGraw‑Hill, New York
Gehrke C, Lager C (1995) Environmental taxes, relative prices and choice of technique in a linear model of production. 
Metroeconomica 46(2):127–145
Hosoda E (2010a) Malfunction of a market in a transaction of waste: a reason for the necessity of an upstream policy in 
waste management. In: Vint J (ed) Economic theory and economic thought–essays in honour of Ian Steedman. 
Routledge, London, pp 234–253
Hosoda E (2010b) Bads as joint products in a linear production system. In: Birolo A et al (eds) Production, distribution and 
trade. Routledge, London, pp 33–61
Hosoda E (2012) Recycling of waste and downgrading of secondary resources in a classical type of production model. J 
Econ Struct 1:7. doi:10.1186/2193‑2409‑1‑7
Hosoda E (2014) Sorting and recycling in a multi‑sectoral economy: a neo‑Ricardian approach. Metroeconomica 
65(1):58–94. doi:10.1111/meca.12029
Kurz HD (2008) Innovations and profits Schumpeter and the classical heritage. J Econ Behav Organ 67:263–278
Kurz HD, Salvadori N (1995) Theory of production: a long‑period‑analysis. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Lager C (1999) Perverse results of a greening of the tax system. In: Teixeira JR, Carneiro FG (eds) Economic dynamics and 
economic policy. Brasilia, DF, pp 147–160 
Lager C (2001) Joint production with restricted free disposal. Metroeconomica 52(1):49–78
Sraffa P (1960) Production of commodities by means of commodities. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Steedman I (1975) Positive profits with negative surplus value. Econ J 85:604–608
Steedman I (1977) Marx after sraffa. NLB, London
Ueno K (2004) Recycling and eco‑design of household electric appliances. Waste Manag Res 15(3):115–122 (in Japanese)
